Under Pressure: Addressing Warehouse Productivity Quotas and the Rise In Workplace Injuries by Julia Lang Gordon
Fordham Urban Law Journal 
Volume 49 
Number 1 Our Best Shot: The Legality and 
Options Surrounding Vaccinations 
Article 5 
2021 
Under Pressure: Addressing Warehouse Productivity Quotas and 
the Rise In Workplace Injuries 
Julia Lang Gordon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj 
Recommended Citation 
Julia Lang Gordon, Under Pressure: Addressing Warehouse Productivity Quotas and the Rise In Workplace 
Injuries, 49 Fordham Urb. L.J. 149 (2021). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol49/iss1/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The 




UNDER PRESSURE: ADDRESSING 
WAREHOUSE PRODUCTIVITY QUOTAS AND 
THE RISE IN WORKPLACE INJURIES 
Julia Lang Gordon* 
 
Introduction ............................................................................................. 150 
I. The Relationship Between Productivity Quotas and             
Employee Injuries ............................................................................ 153 
II. Enabling Factors of the High Employee Injury Rates at        
Amazon Warehouses ....................................................................... 157 
A. Unrestricted Employee Surveillance ................................... 157 
B. Employees Have Few Job Alternatives ............................... 159 
C. The Ubiquity of At-Will Employment ................................. 162 
D. OSHA’s Limited Enforcement Capabilities ....................... 165 
i. Occupational Safety and Health Act: A Primer ............ 165 
ii. OSHA’s Attempt to Regulate Ergonomic Hazards .... 166 
iii. OSHA’s Limited Capacity and Ineffectual 
Penalties ........................................................................... 168 
III. How to Stop the Clock: Legislative and Regulatory Efforts to 
Reduce Warehouse Worker Injuries ............................................. 170 
A. Reform the OSH Act ............................................................. 170 
i. Private Right of Action ..................................................... 170 
ii. Greater Whistleblower Protections ............................... 172 
B. Restricting the Quota Directly: California’s State     
Assembly Bills ....................................................................... 175 
C. Restricting Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace: 
Massachusetts and Illinois Bills .......................................... 178 
i. The Massachusetts Approach .......................................... 178 
ii. The Illinois Approach ...................................................... 180 
 
* J.D., 2022, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2017, Bard College. Thank you 
to Professor Tracy Higgins and Professor Jennifer Gordon for their insight and 
guidance during the writing of this Note and to the editors and staff of the Fordham 
Urban Law Journal for their thoughtful feedback. Finally, many thanks to my family 
and friends for their love and support. 
150 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIX 
IV. A Way Forward via the Illinois Approach and                             
the California Mandate .................................................................... 182 
A. Electronic Monitoring and Just Cause ................................. 183 
B. Critiques of a Just Cause Approach ..................................... 185 
C. Mandate to State OSHA to Promulgate Standards ............ 187 
Conclusion ............................................................................................... 188 
 
INTRODUCTION  
When the auto parts plant where he had worked for nine years 
closed down, Darryl Richardson was excited to land a job as a 
“picker” at an Amazon warehouse.1  His excitement was short lived.  
Richardson found that the job required employees to work at a 
breakneck speed or risk termination.2  He saw co-workers fired for 
failing to meet Amazon’s productivity quotas, and Richardson himself 
was expected to pick 315 items per hour.3  “I thought it would be 
different,” Richardson said.4  “You ain’t got time to look around.  
You get treated like a number.  You don’t get treated like a person.  
They work you like a robot.”5 
Across the country, many companies hire warehouse workers, 
including “logistics companies” that help retailers like Disney or 
Verizon deliver their products to consumers.6  This Note mainly 
focuses on Amazon, as it employs more than one million people 
worldwide7 and exerts huge influence in the warehouse industry.8  
 
 1. See Steven Greenhouse, ‘We Deserve More’: An Amazon Warehouse’s High-
Stakes Union Drive, GUARDIAN (Feb. 23, 2021, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/feb/23/amazon-bessemer-alabama-
union [https://perma.cc/GR36-TE2U]. 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See The Daily, The Human Toll of Instant Delivery, N.Y. TIMES, at 3:30 (Nov. 
26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/26/podcasts/the-daily/warehouse-
workers-instant-delivery.html [https://perma.cc/HN9N-4KHS] (discussing XPO 
Logistics). 
 7. Aimee Picchi, Amazon Says It Now Has More than 1 Million Employees, 
CBS NEWS (Oct. 30, 2020, 2:18 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/amazon-1-
million-employees/ [https://perma.cc/K3NF-F86X]. 
 8. See BETH GUTELIUS & NIK THEODORE, UC BERKELEY LAB. CTR., THE 
FUTURE OF WAREHOUSE WORK: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN THE U.S. LOGISTICS 
INDUSTRY 45 (2019), https://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/pdf/2019/Future-of-Warehouse-
Work.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SUZ-NTSX] (“Amazon’s influence in the online retail 
arena is significant, particularly in the context of the company’s promises of 
increasingly faster delivery.”); see also ATHENA COAL., PACKAGING PAIN: 
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While warehouse jobs are not new, Amazon has transformed the 
industry by subjecting its workers9 to constant electronic monitoring 
and demanding productivity quotas,10 leading to employee injury 
rates far above the national average.11 
Amazon monitors its employees with an automated system that 
instructs them which items to pick and tracks their “time off task,” 
such as using the restroom or pausing to drink water.12  If too much 
time is spent off task, the system can automatically issue warnings and 
fire a worker without any human interaction.13  Fearing termination 
for failing to meet their quota, employees work at dangerous speeds 
that put their health and safety at risk.14  In 2019, the overall injury 
rate at Amazon warehouses was 7.7 serious injuries for every 100 
employees, nearly double the industry average of four serious injuries 
for every 100 employees.15  Amazon’s fulfillment center in DuPont, 
Washington, had the highest 2019 injury rate of any Amazon 
warehouse in the country: 22 serious injuries per 100 employees,16 
 
WORKPLACE INJURIES IN AMAZON’S EMPIRE 6–7 (2019), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-
content/uploads/NELP-Report-Amazon-Packaging-Pain.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y836-
53TC] (“Amazon sets the standard for delivery and fulfillment in the eCommerce 
industry and it also undeniably sets the standards for employment practices and 
working conditions in the industry.”). 
 9. When referring to Amazon warehouse workers, this Note uses the terms 
“workers” and “employees” interchangeably because unlike workers at a company 
like Uber, Amazon warehouse workers are employees, not independent contractors. 
See Rani Molla, Why Amazon Pays Warehouse Employees to Tweet About Their 
Jobs, VOX (Aug. 8, 2019, 9:30 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/8/8/20726863/amazon-pays-warehouse-employees-
twitter-fc-ambassadors-quillette [https://perma.cc/74KP-NQVY]. 
 10. See IRENE TUNG, PAUL SONN & JARED ODESSKY, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, 
‘JUST CAUSE’ JOB PROTECTIONS: BUILDING RACIAL EQUITY AND SHIFTING THE 
POWER BALANCE BETWEEN WORKERS AND EMPLOYERS 9 (2021), 
https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Just-Cause-Job-Protections-2021.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YBS3-CHSG] (“[Amazon] has pioneered and promoted new forms 
of on-the-job electronic monitoring . . . .”); see also Will Evans, Ruthless Quotas at 
Amazon Are Maiming Employees, ATLANTIC (Dec. 5, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/11/amazon-warehouse-reports-
show-worker-injuries/602530/ [https://perma.cc/BRB2-3K7N] (“Marc Wulfraat, 
president of the supply-chain and logistics consulting firm MWPVL International, 
described Amazon as more aggressive than any other industry player in what the 
company expects from workers.”). 
 11. See infra Part I. 
 12. See ATHENA COAL., supra note 8, at 5. 
 13. See infra Section II.A. 
 14. See infra Part I. 
 15. See Will Evans, How Amazon Hid Its Safety Crisis, REVEAL (Sept. 29, 2020), 
https://revealnews.org/article/how-amazon-hid-its-safety-crisis/ 
[https://perma.cc/R65A-MTVB]. 
 16. Id. 
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which was more than five times the industry average.17  Amazon has 
created a workplace where employees are forced to work at unsafe 
speeds that lead to physical harm. 
Despite the severity of this problem, the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA), the federal agency tasked with 
regulating workplaces and reducing employee injuries, has failed to 
protect warehouse workers.18  Between 2014 and 2019, OSHA 
inspected fewer than one quarter of Amazon warehouses,19 and the 
financial penalties it issued have not changed the company’s 
behavior.20 
Over 25 states in the United States are home to Amazon 
warehouses.21  Most states have not yet considered legislation to 
remedy the novel issue of high employee injury rates in Amazon 
warehouses, but a few, including California, Massachusetts, and 
Illinois, have proposed bills that would place restrictions on how 
warehouse employers can use productivity quotas.22  This Note 
recommends that states adopt legislation resembling the Illinois 
approach, which both prohibits the use of data gathered through 
electronic monitoring from being the basis for employment decisions 
and creates an affirmative obligation on employers to have a good 
reason for firing employees.23  This Note also advocates for a 
provision24 of the California bill mandating that California’s Division 
of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA) promulgate 
standards aimed at reducing injuries among warehouse workers.25  
Such a mandate would create an opportunity for state OSHA 
agencies to promulgate standards directly targeting warehouse 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-596, § 2, 84 Stat. 
1590, 1590 (stating that the purpose of the act is to ensure safe working conditions 
“by encouraging employers and employees in their efforts to reduce the number of 
occupational safety and health hazards at their places of employment, and . . . by 
providing for the development and promulgation of occupational safety and health 
standards); see also infra Section II.E. 
 19. See ATHENA COAL., supra note 8, at 16. 
 20. See infra Section II.D.iii. 
 21. See Nate Rattner & Annie Palmer, This Map Shows How Amazon’s 
Warehouses Are Rapidly Expanding Across the Country, CNBC (Jan. 19, 2020, 9:05 
AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/19/map-of-amazon-warehouses.html 
[https://perma.cc/BE7H-KQE2]. 
 22. See infra Sections III.B–C. 
 23. See infra Section III.C.ii. 
 24. The State Senate amended the bill and removed this provision. See infra 
Section III.B. 
 25. See infra Section III.B. 
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worker safety,26 such as a requirement that workers are allowed a 
break to stretch once per hour.  Of the strategies being considered by 
state legislatures, these two approaches taken together would be the 
most effective at restricting Amazon’s ability to sustain an unsafe 
workplace. 
Part I of this Note explains the relationship between productivity 
quotas at Amazon and employee injuries and describes the types of 
injuries employees typically sustain.  Part II examines four factors 
that have enabled Amazon to continue to enforce productivity quotas 
without restriction, despite their having led to an increased rate of 
employee injuries.  These factors are the limited regulation of 
employee surveillance, the lack of employment alternatives for 
warehouse workers, the ubiquity of at-will employment, and the 
limitations on OSHA’s enforcement capabilities.  Part III outlines 
scholars’ recommendations for reforming the Occupational Safety 
and Health (OSH) Act, including a private right of action for workers 
and stronger whistleblower protections.  Part III also reviews three 
bills introduced by state legislatures in California, Massachusetts, and 
Illinois that would provide for greater regulation of productivity 
quotas in warehouses and the mechanisms used to measure worker 
productivity.  Part IV argues that the Illinois approach, combined 
with a specific mandate included in the proposed California bill, 
would afford the best protection to warehouse workers. 
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRODUCTIVITY QUOTAS          
AND EMPLOYEE INJURIES 
This Part traces the relationship between Amazon’s productivity 
quotas and the high rate of employee injuries by describing how 
employees get injured, the type of injuries commonly sustained, and 
the lack of appropriate medical care at Amazon facilities. 
Employees at Amazon are required to meet assigned productivity 
quotas, a process known as “mak[ing] rate.”27  Rates can vary, but 
employees have reported being expected to scan over 300 items per 
 
 26. See Assemb. B. 701 § 6726, 2020–2021 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2021) (“By January 1, 
2023, the division shall propose to the standards board for the board’s review and 
adoption a standard that minimizes the risk of musculoskeletal injuries and disorders 
among employees working in warehouse distribution centers . . . . The standard shall 
address, among other considerations, the relationship between quotas and risk factors 
for musculoskeletal injuries and disorders . . . .”). 
 27. See Chavie Lieber, Muslim Amazon Workers Say They Don’t Have Enough 
Time to Pray. Now They’re Fighting for Their Rights, VOX (Dec. 17, 2018, 10:56 
AM), https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2018/12/14/18141291/amazon-fulfillment-
center-east-africa-workers-minneapolis [https://perma.cc/HZ6Q-EZ3W]. 
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hour.28  According to a report published by Human Impact Partners 
and the Warehouse Worker Resource Center, “[e]xactly how 
Amazon determines work quotas remains unclear to many 
employees.  Workers we spoke with expressed that their quotas seem 
to be arbitrary, fluctuating without warning based on task, day, and 
season.”29 
What makes the productivity quota at Amazon warehouses most 
alarming is its relationship to workplace injuries.  According to a 
report by the Athena Coalition that examined injury logs from 28 
Amazon facilities in 16 states, the Total Recordable Injury Rate at 
the Amazon warehouses in 2018 was 10.76 per 100 full-time 
equivalent workers, which is three times as high as the injury rates 
across all private employers — 2.8 recordable injuries per 100 
employees.30  Amazon employees are more likely to be injured at 
work than police officers, solid waste collectors, lumberjacks, or coal 
miners.31 
Over 75% of the injuries recorded in the injury logs examined by 
the Athena Coalition were musculoskeletal injuries, such as sprains, 
strains, and tears, with the most commonly injured body parts being 
workers’ backs, shoulders, knees, wrists, ankles, and elbows.32  These 
injuries are caused by ergonomic hazards, including forceful 
exertions, repetitive motions like twisting and bending, and awkward 
postures.33   The risk of injury associated with these movements 
increases considerably with the pace of work.34  The average injured 
Amazon worker in the Athena Coalition’s sample was forced to miss 
six and a half weeks of work.35 
 
 28. See Evans, supra note 10; Erika Hayasaki, Amazon’s Great Labor 
Awakening, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/18/magazine/amazon-workers-employees-covid-
19.html [https://perma.cc/V3S5-MZ2D]. 
 29. HUM. IMPACT PARTNERS, THE PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS HIDDEN IN AMAZON 
WAREHOUSES 4 (2021), https://humanimpact.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/The-
Public-Health-Crisis-Hidden-In-Amazon-Warehouses-HIP-WWRC-01-21.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5SGR-PEP8]; see also TUNG ET AL., supra note 10, at 7. 
 30. ATHENA COAL., supra note 8, at 8. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See id. at 9. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See id.; see also Evans, supra note 15 (“According to Kathleen Fagan, a 
physician who inspected Amazon warehouses in her capacity as a medical officer for 
the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration, or OSHA, studies have 
shown that production rates have a direct impact on injuries.”). 
 35. ATHENA COAL., supra note 8. 
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In 2019, The Atlantic interviewed several former Amazon 
warehouse employees about their workplace injuries.36  One of those 
employees was Candace Dixon, who started working at Amazon in 
April of 2018.37  Dixon worked at the warehouse in Eastvale, 
California, an Amazon warehouse with a serious injury rate more 
than four times the 2018 industry average.38  After just two months, 
Dixon could no longer work at the warehouse due to her injuries.39  
An Amazon-approved doctor diagnosed her with a back sprain, joint 
inflammation, and chronic pain, and determined that her injuries 
were due to her job.40  Months after leaving Amazon, Dixon could 
barely climb stairs, and getting out of a chair or walking her dog was 
still painful.41  While Amazon does instruct employees on how to 
move their bodies and do their jobs safely, workers have complained 
that they regularly need to break these safety protocols to meet their 
quotas.42  The Atlantic reported: “They would jump or stretch to 
reach a top rack instead of using a stepladder.  They would twist and 
bend over to grab boxes instead of taking time to squat and lift with 
their legs . . . . They had to, they said, or they would lose their jobs.”43 
In addition to ergonomic injuries, employees have also reported 
getting urinary tract infections because they do not have time to use 
the restroom.44  During a ten-hour shift, an employee only has one 
half-hour break and two 15-minute breaks,45 and any trips to the 
restroom outside of these designated breaks count against the time 
workers have to meet their quotas.46  Restrooms at Amazon 
warehouses are often a five-to-six-minute walk from workstations, 
making a trip to the restroom a hinderance for workers trying to 
 
 36. See Evans, supra note 10. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See id.; see also Mohamed Al Elew & Soo Oh, What Are Injury Rates Like at 
Amazon Warehouses?, REVEAL (Sept. 29, 2020), 
https://revealnews.org/article/amazon-injury-rates/ [https://perma.cc/W9PH-AVQU] 
(noting the Eastvale warehouse had a rate of 18.6 serious injuries per 100 workers in 
2018. The industry average that year was four serious injuries per 100 workers). 
 39. See Evans, supra note 10. 
 40. See id. (“An Amazon-approved doctor said she had bulging discs and 
diagnosed her with a back sprain, joint inflammation, and chronic pain, determining 
that her injuries were 100 percent due to her job.”). 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See ATHENA COAL., supra note 8, at 17. 
 46. See id. 
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make rate.47  Kristi Shrum, an employee at an Amazon warehouse in 
Southern California, explained that she got multiple urinary tract 
infections as a result of not using the restroom at work48: “You have 
to hold your pee or not make your rate.  Which one you want to do?  
I had to make my rate.”49  Adam Kester, an Amazon worker from 
Phoenix, stated that he and other workers would bring customers’ 
orders into the restroom and scan them there to meet their quotas.50  
Amazon’s productivity quotas force workers to choose between their 
health and keeping their jobs. 
While many Amazon warehouses are equipped with an “AmCare” 
on-site medical facility, these facilities are typically staffed by 
emergency medical technicians (EMTs) rather than physicians or 
registered nurses.51  EMTs are qualified to provide first aid and to 
determine whether an employee is in need of a hospital visit, but they 
are not certified to diagnose or treat injuries that require more than 
first aid.52  When warehouse workers endure severe muscle or joint 
pain at work, the EMTs at AmCare frequently apply ice to the injury 
and offer the employee over-the-counter pain relievers before 
sending them back to work.53  While this kind of first-aid care may 
mask an employee’s pain, it does not help workers recover or heal,54 
and sending workers back to work while still injured after working 
long hours can increase the likelihood that minor injuries will become 
severe.55  A 2019 OSHA inspection of Amazon’s Robbinsville, New 
Jersey warehouse found that EMTs were permitted to treat workers 
for up to 21 days before referring them to an outside doctor and were 
working outside of their scope of practice.56  Despite these findings, 
OSHA did not issue a citation.57 
 
 47. See HUM. IMPACT PARTNERS, supra note 29, at 11. 
 48. See Evans, supra note 10. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See ATHENA COAL., supra note 8, at 9. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See id. at 10. 
 54. See id. at 11 (“Ice and over the counter pain relievers can help in masking 
pain and in getting workers back at their workstations. But that first aid does nothing 
to help workers actually recover and heal. Worse, it does nothing to address the 
hazards that caused the injury.”). 
 55. See id. (“When supervisors send workers back to work while still injured, 
force them to work long hours, and prohibit them from taking days off for weeks at a 
time, even small injuries can turn into much more severe injuries.”). 
 56. See H. Claire Brown, How Amazon’s On-Site Emergency Care Endangers the 
Warehouse Workers It’s Supposed to Protect, INTERCEPT (Dec. 2, 2019, 6:30 AM), 
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II. ENABLING FACTORS OF THE HIGH EMPLOYEE INJURY RATES 
AT AMAZON WAREHOUSES 
This Part explains four main factors that allow Amazon to push its 
employees to the physical brink while facing little to no repercussions.  
Section II.A describes the limitations on existing legislation regulating 
employee surveillance, which enable Amazon to constantly monitor 
its employees electronically.58  Section II.B explains that many 
warehouse workers at Amazon have few job alternatives, meaning 
that they may be unable to leave the job even if it puts them at risk of 
injury.59  Section II.C examines the employment at-will system, which 
permits employers to fire workers for any reason, including failure to 
meet quotas.60  Lastly, Section II.D surveys OSHA’s restricted 
enforcement capabilities and unsuccessful efforts to deter warehouse 
employers from subjecting workers to dangerous working 
conditions.61 
A. Unrestricted Employee Surveillance 
Amazon uses an automated tracking system to constantly monitor 
workers.62  If a worker spends too much time off task or fails to meet 
his or her quota, the system can automatically generate warning 
letters and fire the employee.63  A letter from an attorney 




 57. See id.; see also Letter from Paula Dixon-Roderick, Area Dir., U.S. Dep’t of 
Lab., to Andrew Ming, Senior Reg’l Env’t Health & Safety Manager, Amazon 
Fulfillment Ctr. (Aug. 19, 2019), 
https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/6584275/Amazon-Robbinsville-OSHA-
Letter-081919.pdf [https://perma.cc/GAA3-NFAP] (“[T]he current OSHA inspection 
again revealed instances indicating that the EMTs and Athletic Trainers (ATs) at 
AMCARE are working outside their scope of practice, without proper 
supervision . . . . OSHA has decided not to issue a citation for these patient care 
issues at this time . . . .”). 
 58. See DANIEL A. HANLEY & SALLY HUBBARD, OPEN MARKETS, EYES 
EVERYWHERE: AMAZON’S SURVEILLANCE INFRASTRUCTURE AND REVITALIZING 
WORKER POWER 7 (2020). 
 59. See infra Section II.B. 
 60. See infra Section II.C. 
 61. See infra Section II.D. 
 62. See ATHENA COAL., supra note 8, at 5. 
 63. See id. at 17 (citing Colin Lecher, How Amazon Automatically Tracks and 
Fires Warehouse Workers for ‘Productivity,’ VERGE (Apr. 25, 2019, 12:06 PM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/25/18516004/amazon-warehouse-fulfillment-
centers-productivity-firing-terminations [https://perma.cc/XW7V-X6XR]). 
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any human involvement.64  The letter stated: “Amazon’s system 
tracks the rates of each individual associate’s productivity and 
automatically generates any warnings or terminations regarding 
quality or productivity without input from supervisors.”65  Parker 
Knight, a disabled veteran and former Amazon employee at the 
Troutdale, Oregon warehouse, reported that his quota required him 
to pick 385 small items or 350 medium items per hour.66  One week, 
he was meeting 98.45% of his expected rate, rather than 100%, and as 
a result, he received a written warning letter.67  This 1.55% speed 
shortfall was enough to trigger Amazon’s disciplinary system. 
Amazon can constantly monitor its employees’ productivity and 
terminate workers based on this productivity data because worker 
surveillance is largely unregulated.68  Although there are a small 
number of federal privacy statutes, they are unhelpful in protecting 
employees from productivity monitoring.  For example, the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act69 (ECPA) prohibits the 
interception of electronic communication without consent.70  But 
there is no interception when an employee uses a company device,71 
such as the Amazon scanners that track warehouse workers.  Title II 
of the ECPA restricts access to stored electronic information without 
proper authorization.72  However, the statute does not address 
situations in which employees are required to submit to electronic 
monitoring as a prerequisite to employment, thereby authorizing the 
employer to access electronic information about employees, 
rendering the ECPA inapplicable.73  While several states have passed 
laws to address location tracking of employees, these laws only 
prohibit such tracking when it is done without the worker’s consent or 
 
 64. See Colin Lecher, How Amazon Automatically Tracks and Fires Warehouse 
Workers for ‘Productivity,’ VERGE (Apr. 25, 2019, 12:06 PM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/25/18516004/amazon-warehouse-fulfillment-
centers-productivity-firing-terminations [https://perma.cc/XW7V-X6XR] (critics have 
argued that the use of an automated termination process creates an environment 
where workers are treated like numbers rather than people). 
 65. Id. at 3. 
 66. See Evans, supra note 10. 
 67. See id. 
 68. See HANLEY & HUBBARD, supra note 58, at 3. 
 69. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–23. 
 70. See Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Limitless Worker 
Surveillance, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 735, 748 (2017). 
 71. See id. at 749. 
 72. See id. at 749–50. 
 73. See id. at 750. 
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without first providing notice.74  This type of legislation would not 
protect Amazon warehouse workers who know about the electronic 
monitoring and were required to consent to it in order to get hired.  
Both federal and state law is currently ill-equipped to regulate 
surveillance of employee productivity. 
B. Employees Have Few Job Alternatives 
Warehouse workers often have limited job alternatives,75 which 
enables Amazon to subject its employees to working conditions that 
lead to frequent injury.  In many of the cities and regions where 
Amazon warehouses are located, such as Memphis, Tennessee, or the 
Inland Empire of California,76 warehouse jobs are one of the few 
employment opportunities providing a decent wage for someone 
without a college degree.77  A report by The Atlantic explained that 
many poor cities are eager for Amazon warehouses to open in their 
communities; “[f]or many places, the choice is not between Amazon 
or another, better employer.  The choice, instead, is Amazon or 
nothing.”78  Sheheryar Kaoosji, Executive Director of the Warehouse 
Worker Resource Center, based in the Inland Empire, explained: “It 
really does feel like you’re going to end up at Amazon and you don’t 
have much of a choice.”79  She added, if not at Amazon, you may 
“end up at another warehouse that is cuing its standards off of 
 
 74. See id. at 758–59. California has made it a misdemeanor to use an electronic 
tracking device to determine the location of a person without their consent. See id. at 
758. A Connecticut statute prohibits employers from electronically monitoring 
employees without prior notice. See id. at 758–59. 
 75. See infra notes 76–80 and accompanying text. 
 76. The Inland Empire is a region in Southern California that encompasses 
Riverside and San Bernardino counties. See Alana Semuels, What Amazon Does to 
Poor Cities, ATLANTIC (Feb. 1, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2018/02/amazon-warehouses-poor-
cities/552020/ [https://perma.cc/QT9E-FPYN]. 
 77. See The Daily, supra note 6, at 6:01 (“Because of the rise and the dominance 
of Amazon and other e-retailers, the landscape and the job opportunities for people 
without college degrees have vastly changed . . . . [I]f you don’t have a college degree 
and you were looking for a good job . . . a warehouse job is the best job in town.”); 
see also Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Natalie Kitroeff, Miscarrying at Work: The 
Physical Toll of Pregnancy Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/21/business/pregnancy-discrimination-
miscarriages.html [https://perma.cc/XV8T-REXJ] (“On Memphis’s east side, 
[warehouse jobs] are often the highest-paying jobs available for people without 
college degrees.”). 
 78. Semuels, supra note 76. 
 79. Hayasaki, supra note 28. 
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Amazon.”80  Leaving Amazon to take a better or safer job is simply 
not an option for many warehouse workers. 
In addition to having limited job alternatives, data from several 
states shows that a significant portion of warehouse employees 
receive government assistance.81  For example, in 2017, one in three 
Amazon workers in Arizona received food stamps or lived with 
someone who did.82  In Pennsylvania, one in ten Amazon employees 
received food stamps, with a similar proportion found in Ohio.83  Of 
six states that provided data to the Government Accountability 
Office, Amazon was among the top ten employers of Medicaid 
recipients in five of those states.84 
While Amazon pays its warehouse employees $15 per hour, a rate 
above the federal minimum wage, data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics revealed that in 68 counties where Amazon has opened 
warehouse facilities, the average industry compensation slipped by 
more than 6% during the facility’s first two years.85  For example, “in 
Robbinsville, New Jersey, warehouse workers made $24 [an] hour on 
average” before Amazon opened a fulfillment center there.86  In 2019, 
after Amazon moved in, the average hourly rate for warehouse 
workers was $17.50.87  The Atlantic reported a similar phenomenon in 
California, noting that the jobs that used to occupy the labor market 
in San Bernardino were unionized and offered good benefits, such as 
jobs at the Kaiser steel mill, the Santa Fe railroad maintenance yard, 
 
 80. Id.; see also GUTELIUS & THEODORE, supra note 8, at 38 (“While the so-called 
‘Amazon effect’ sometimes is exaggerated, the fact is that Amazon has had 
considerable impacts both on its direct retail competitors and on the warehousing 
industry as a whole . . . .”). 
 81. See H. Clare Brown, Despite Now Offering $15 Minimum Wage, Amazon 
Still a Top Employer of SNAP Recipients in Many States, COUNTER (Nov. 19, 2020, 
12:09 PM), https://thecounter.org/15-minimum-wage-amazon-top-employer-snap-
recipients-walmart-mcdonalds/ [https://perma.cc/ZR5D-FSMC]; see also Matt Day & 
Spencer Soper, Amazon Has Turned a Middle-Class Warehouse Career into a 
McJob, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 17, 2020, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-12-17/amazon-amzn-job-pay-rate-
leaves-some-warehouse-employees-homeless [https://perma.cc/TAZ6-WK6G]. 
 82. See Dennis Green, Data from States Shows Thousands of Amazon 
Employees Are on Food Stamps, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 25, 2018, 9:09 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-employees-on-food-stamps-2018-8 
[https://perma.cc/5GX8-M2D4]. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See Brown, supra note 81. 
 85. See Day & Soper, supra note 81. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See id. 
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and the Norton Air Force Base.88  Today, jobs in Amazon warehouses 
pay less, are not unionized, and require multiple members of a 
household to work, often more than one job, to make ends meet.89 
Job mobility is made even more difficult for the 66% of warehouse 
employees who are people of color,90 and already face systemic 
economic disadvantages in the labor market.91  For example, Black 
and Latinx employees are more likely than white employees to face 
an extended period of unemployment after a job separation.92  In 
addition, historical and present-day racial inequality in the United 
States has caused Black and Latinx workers to have fewer household 
savings to fall back on during periods of unemployment, rendering 
job termination more severe.93  Since people of color are already 
disadvantaged in the labor market, the risks associated with leaving a 
job are higher than for their white counterparts. 
 
 88. See Semuels, supra note 76. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See GUTELIUS & THEODORE, supra note 8, at 24–25 (“[W]orkers of color 
make up 66% of warehousing industry workers . . . whereas workers of color are just 
37% of the total U.S. labor force.”). 
 91. See Christian E. Weller, African Americans Face Systematic Obstacles to 




African American workers still face more hurdles to get a job, never mind a 
good one, than their white counterparts. They continue to face 
systematically higher unemployment rates, fewer job opportunities, lower 
pay, poorer benefits, and greater job instability. These persistent differences 
reflect systematic barriers to quality jobs, such as outright discrimination 
against African American workers. 
Id.; see also Valerie Wilson, Black Unemployment Is at Least Twice as High as 
White Unemployment at the National Level and in 14 States and the District of 
Columbia, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.epi.org/publication/valerie-
figures-state-unemployment-by-race/ [https://perma.cc/GM9Z-GEYB] (“In the 
fourth quarter of 2018, African American workers had the highest unemployment 
rate nationally, at 6.5 percent, followed by Hispanic (4.5 percent), Asian (3.2 percent) 
and white workers (3.1 percent).”). 
 92. See TUNG ET AL., supra note 10, at 4 (“[F]rom 2010 to 2019, the rate of 
separations for white workers resulting in lack of steady employment for three 
months or more as a share of total employment was 4.4 percent. For Black workers 
the rate was 5.8 percent, and for Latinx workers it was 5.3 percent.”). 
 93. See id. at II; see also Kriston McIntosh et al., Examining the Black-White 
Wealth Gap, BROOKINGS (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-
front/2020/02/27/examining-the-black-white-wealth-gap/ [https://perma.cc/CBY5-
FM38]. 
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C. The Ubiquity of At-Will Employment 
State law gives employers considerable latitude to terminate 
employees at will, which makes it significantly easier for Amazon to 
fire workers for failing to meet productivity quotas.  In all U.S. states 
except Montana, an at-will employment relationship between 
employers and employees is presumed,94 meaning that in the absence 
of an employment agreement stating otherwise, employers can fire 
employees for any reason or no reason at all.95  Some notable 
exceptions to at-will employment are codified in anti-discrimination 
statutes, which prohibit employers from terminating workers based 
on protected classes such as race, sex, and ability.96 
While the at-will doctrine has never been affirmatively adopted in 
federal legislation, it was established in the nation’s jurisprudence in 
the late nineteenth century.97  After Congress passed the Thirteenth 
Amendment, employers looked for new ways to control workers, 
including formerly enslaved people and bonded immigrant laborers, 
and many employers threatened workers with termination as a way to 
exercise control over them.98  In the years after the end of 
Reconstruction, industrial employers promoted the at-will doctrine 
and courts began consistently ruling against the notion that employers 
needed a reason to fire workers.99 
 
 94. See Jared Odessky, A New Moment for Wrongful Discharge Law, ONLABOR 
(July 16, 2020), https://onlabor.org/a-new-moment-for-wrongful-discharge-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/USU2-E5MZ]. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See William R. Corbett, “You’re Fired!”: The Common Law Should Respond 
with the Refashioned Tort of Abusive Discharge, 41 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 63, 
77 (2020). In addition, anti-retaliation statutes prohibit employers from firing 
employees for retaliatory reasons, such as to punish an employee for filing a 
complaint with a regulatory agency. Id. at 77–78. 
 97. See TUNG ET AL., supra note 10, at 1. 
 98. See id. at 29. Some formerly enslaved workers were terminated for asking to 
be paid their wages, and others were fired for attempting to vote. See id. Railroad 
companies lobbied for a new law to make it easier to control their immigrant 
workforce, but the Reconstruction Congress rejected the bill for being too similar to 
earlier forms of servitude. See id. at 30. 
 99. See id. at 1 (citing Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United 
States: The Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 65–86 (2000)). 
In 1877, a New York-based railroad attorney named Horace Wood published a 
treatise in which he argued for at-will employment. Wood asserted that since workers 
had a “right to quit” without penalty, given the recent ban on slavery and servitude, 
employers should also have the right to fire workers at any time for any reason. In 
the years after Wood’s treatise was published, state and federal courts began to rely 
on Wood’s rationale to reject the notion that employers needed cause to fire workers. 
Id. at 30. 
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While most scholars criticize at-will employment, there is a 
minority who defend it, often relying on freedom of contract as a 
justification.100  One of the most well-known defenders of the at-will 
rule is Richard Epstein,101 who argued that freedom of contract is “an 
end in itself,”102 and limitations on this freedom restrict the power of 
workers and employees to come to mutually beneficial 
arrangements.103  Addressing concerns about coercive employers, 
Epstein noted that the ability of an employee to quit at any time 
would minimize employer misbehavior since workers would just quit 
if the burdens of the job outweighed its benefits.104  Epstein asserted: 
“It is hardly plausible that contracts at will could be so pervasive in all 
businesses and at all levels if they did not serve the interests of 
employees as well as employers.”105  Other scholars have argued more 
broadly that an employment at-will system provides employers with 
an incentive to hire more workers in times of growth, knowing that 
employees can be fired easily at any time.106 
Critics of employment at-will point out that employers and 
employees often possess unequal bargaining power, which 
undermines the assumption that workers can simply quit if they are 
being treated poorly by their employer.107  If already vulnerable 
workers know that employers have enormous discretion to terminate 
them for almost any reason, they will fear asking for higher wages or 
 
 100. See Jonathan Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject at Work: A New Perspective 
on the Employment At-Will Debate, 43 SW. L. REV. 275, 280 (2013). 
 101. Id.; see also Richard Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 947 (1984). 
 102. See Epstein, supra note 101, at 953. 
 103. See id. at 954. 
 104. See id. at 966–67. 
 105. Id. at 955. 
 106. See Larry A. Dimatteo, Robert C. Bird & Jason A. Colquitt, Justice, 
Employment, and the Psychological Contract, 90 OR. L. REV. 449, 459 (2011) 
(highlighting benefits to employment at-will, such as the flexibility that employers 
have to make rapid shifts to staffing in times of economic decline or expansion). 
 107. See Daniel J. Libenson, Leasing Human Capital: Toward A New Foundation 
for Employment Termination Law, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 111, 123 (2006) 
(“A steady stream of criticism has flowed from the legal academy . . . . The precise 
nature of the criticism varies, but an important common denominator is that the at-
will rule essentially gives employers an unchecked right to impose devastating 
economic and personal harms on undeserving individuals.”); see also Frank J. Cavico, 
Employment at Will and Public Policy, 25 AKRON L. REV. 497, 502 (1991) (“Given 
the considerable disparity in economic power and bargaining positions between 
employers and employees, particularly large corporate employers, and the 
employer’s chiefly unchecked control over the terms and conditions of the 
employment relation, abuses in the treatment of employees naturally arise.”). 
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better working conditions.108  A survey conducted in Illinois 
evaluating the impacts of at-will employment revealed that 68% of 
over 800 workers interviewed reported that they or a co-worker 
worked when sick or injured to avoid being fired.109 
To combat this type of dynamic, virtually all union agreements 
require that employees can only be terminated for good reason, often 
known as “just cause” rules.110  Such rules, which require that 
employers demonstrate good-faith and job-related reasons when 
firing employees, help to balance the employer-employee relationship 
and empower workers to oppose dangerous working conditions 
without fear.111 
Amazon does not have any warehouses in Montana,112 and 
therefore only operates in states where at-will employment is 
presumed.  In addition, the company has aggressively and to date, 
successfully, fought attempts to unionize its warehouse employees.113  
 
 108. See SHARON BLOCK & BENJAMIN SACHS, CLEAN SLATE FOR WORKER POWER, 
CLEAN SLATE FOR WORKER POWER: BUILDING A JUST ECONOMY AND DEMOCRACY 
47 (2019) (“When employees know that they can be discharged at will — for nearly 
any reason at all — they rightly come to fear displeasing their employer. Indeed, in 
an at-will regime, workers learn that displeasing their employer can mean the end of 
their ability to support themselves and their families.”). 
 109. See TUNG ET AL., supra note 10, at 5 (citing UGO OKERE ET AL., NAT’L EMP. 
L. PROJECT, SECURE JOBS, SAFE WORKPLACES, AND STABLE COMMUNITIES: ENDING 
AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT IN ILLINOIS (2021)). 
 110. See M. PATRICIA SMITH, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, IN SUPPORT OF INT. 1396 & 
INT. 1415 EXTENDING “JUST CAUSE” EMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS TO NEW YORK’S 
FAST FOOD WORKERS 2 (2020), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2020-2-13-
NELP-Testimony-of-Patricia-Smith-re-NYC-Just-Cause.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZA9-
BB44]. 
 111. See BLOCK & SACHS, supra note 108 (explaining that just cause rules would 
help rebalance the power dynamic between employers and employees). 
 112. See Nate Rattner & Amy Palmer, This Map Shows How Amazon’s 
Warehouses Are Rapidly Expanding Across the Country, CNBC (Jan. 19, 2020, 9:05 
AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/19/map-of-amazon-warehouses.html 
[https://perma.cc/JTR6-SYXD] (showing a map indicating there are no Amazon 
warehouses in Montana). 
 113. While there were recent efforts to unionize an Amazon warehouse in 
Bessemer, Alabama, when it was put to an official vote, the majority of employees 
voted against joining the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union. See Alina 
Selyukh, It’s a No: Amazon Warehouse Workers Vote Against Unionizing in 
Historic Election, NPR (Apr. 9, 2021, 1:28 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2021/04/09/982139494/its-a-no-amazon-warehouse-workers-vote-
against-unionizing-in-historic-election [https://perma.cc/R72D-4XRL]. Amazon used 
various tactics to try to convince workers to vote against unionization, including 
holding lengthy “information sessions” that explained to employees why unions were 
unnecessary, as well as covering the warehouse in fliers with the message, “Do it 
without dues.” Id. During the voting period, employees reported being asked by 
supervisors multiple times whether they had voted yet. See Alina Selyukh, High 
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As a result, it is legal for Amazon to fire any of its warehouse workers 
for failing to make rate. 
D. OSHA’s Limited Enforcement Capabilities 
OSHA has failed to deter Amazon’s behavior or provide 
warehouse workers with proper protections, which further enables 
the company to use productivity quotas that lead to widespread 
employee injury.114  To understand the reasons for OSHA’s failure, it 
is useful to examine the history of the agency and its enforcement 
shortcomings, as well as its prior attempts to reduce ergonomic 
injuries in the workplace. 
i. Occupational Safety and Health Act: A Primer 
In 1970, Congress passed the OSH Act in order to ensure “safe and 
healthful working conditions for working men and women.”115  With 
the passage of the OSH Act, Congress created OSHA, a regulatory 
agency with the authority to set and enforce protective workplace 
safety and health standards.116  The agency covers most private sector 
employers and workers in all 50 states,117 either directly or through 
OSHA-approved state plans.118  State OSHA plans are required to be 
at least as effective as federal OSHA plans in protecting workers and 
preventing workplace injuries, and can be more expansive, such as by 
covering state and local government employers, rather than just 
private sector employers.119 
 
Stakes at a Warehouse: Amazon Fights Against Alabama Union Drive, NPR (Mar. 
12, 2021, 1:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/03/12/976141488/high-stakes-at-a-
warehouse-amazon-fights-against-alabama-union-drive [https://perma.cc/42EP-
5WC5]. 
 114. See infra Section II.D.iii. 
 115. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590. 
 116. See OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., OSHA 3439-B-12R, OSHA 
AT-A-GLANCE (2014) [hereinafter OSHA AT-A-GLANCE], 
https://www.osha.gov/sites/default/files/publications/3439at-a-glance.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9DDH-QTAM]. OSHA is part of the United States Department of 
Labor. See About OSHA, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., 
https://www.osha.gov/aboutosha [https://perma.cc/94ET-M4ZC] (last visited Nov. 2, 
2021). 
 117. See OSHA AT-A-GLANCE, supra note 116. 
 118. OSHA-approved state plans are workplace safety and health programs 
operated by individual states. State Plans, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH 
ADMIN., https://www.osha.gov/stateplans [https://perma.cc/EB4G-73QK] (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2021). OSHA also covers employers and workers in Washington D.C. See id. 
 119. See id. 
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Employers are required to follow OSHA standards,120 which cover 
a range of workplace hazards ranging from toxic chemicals to 
excessive noise levels and unsanitary conditions.121  The OSH Act 
also has a General Duty clause, which states that every employer 
“shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of 
employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing 
or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his 
employees.”122  The General Duty clause can encompass hazards that 
are not covered by particular OSHA standards or rules.123 
To enforce its standards, OSHA conducts on-site workplace 
inspections, usually in response to complaints filed by current 
employees.124  When an inspector finds a violation of an OSHA 
standard, the agency can issue citations and fines, which instruct the 
employer on how to cure the violation and a deadline for doing so.125 
ii. OSHA’s Attempt to Regulate Ergonomic Hazards 
In 2000, OSHA attempted to implement standards aimed at 
reducing musculoskeletal injuries, which are the most common 
recorded injuries at Amazon warehouses.126  OSHA promulgated an 
ergonomics regulation in order “to reduce the number and severity of 
[musculoskeletal disorders] caused by exposure to risk factors in the 
workplace.”127  Among other things, the regulation would have 
required employers to provide employees with basic information 
about ergonomic injuries and musculoskeletal disorders (MSDs) and 
implement “feasible” controls to reduce MSD hazards if certain 
triggers were met.128 
 
 120. See OSHA AT-A-GLANCE, supra note 116. 
 121. See Summary of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-occupational-safety-and-health-act 
[https://perma.cc/V58W-KBAC] (last visited Nov. 2, 2021). 
 122. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1). 
 123. See Using OSHA’s General Duty Clause, NAT’L COUNCIL FOR 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, https://www.coshnetwork.org/node/353 
[https://perma.cc/2HTF-ADC2] (last visited Nov. 2, 2021). 
 124. See OSHA AT-A-GLANCE, supra note 116. 
 125. See id. 
 126. See ATHENA COAL., supra note 8, at 9; see also supra Part I. 
 127. 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (2000). 
 128. See Adam M. Finkel & Jason W. Sullivan, A Cost-Benefit Interpretation of 
the “Substantially Similar” Hurdle in the Congressional Review Act: Can OSHA 
Ever Utter the E-Word (Ergonomics) Again?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 707, 120 (2011). 
Such controls can include making tools and equipment adjustable and keeping such 
items within reach, and reducing the need for prolonged or extreme muscle force and 
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OSHA published the final rule in the Federal Register during the 
lame-duck period of the Clinton Administration.129  The rule was met 
with robust opposition from both Republicans and pro-business lobby 
groups.130  Business groups were particularly concerned about the cost 
of complying with the new regulation, leading the National 
Association of Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to 
challenge the regulation in separate lawsuits.131  In the final rule, 
OSHA estimated that compliance with the regulation would cost 
employers $4.5 billion but would save employers $9.1 billion by 
preventing about 4.6 million work-related MSDs over the next ten 
years.132  Democrats who were supportive of the rule pointed to 
scientific evidence, including reports by the National Academy of 
Sciences and the Institute of Medicine, describing the astronomical 
costs of work-related ergonomic injuries.133 
The 107th Congress was able to prevent OSHA’s ergonomic rule 
from going into effect through a set of procedures laid out in the 
Congressional Review Act (CRA) that permit Congress to overturn a 
rule issued by a federal agency.134  Congress issued a joint resolution 
of disapproval of OSHA’s ergonomic rule, and President Bush signed 
 
highly repetitive movements. See Michael Silverstein, Ergonomics and Regulatory 
Politics: The Washington State Case, 50 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 391, 393 (2007). 
 129. See Finkel & Sullivan, supra note 128, at 120. “When Congress is in session 
after a November election, and before the beginning of the new Congress, it is known 
as a ‘lame-duck session.’” Lame Duck Sessions (1940–Present), U.S. SENATE, 
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LameDuckSessions.htm [https://perma.cc/ZE23-
8LP2] (last visited Sept. 19, 2021). 
 130. See Finkel & Sullivan, supra note 128, at 120. 
 131. See Kent Hoover, Two Business Groups File Lawsuits Challenging OSHA 
Ergonomics Rule, HOUS. BUS. J. (Nov. 19, 2000), 
https://www.bizjournals.com/houston/stories/2000/11/20/story6.html 
[https://perma.cc/7YST-8E3J]. 
 132. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (2000). 
 133. See Finkel & Sullivan, supra note 128, at 121. 
 134. See MAEVE P. CAREY & CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 
R43992, THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT (CRA): FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS 1 (2020). Pursuant to the CRA, agencies are required to report on their 
rulemaking to Congress after which members of Congress have a 60-day period to 
submit and act on a joint resolution of disapproval. Id. at 15. If both houses pass the 
resolution and the President signs it, the rule will not take effect, and the agency may 
not issue a rule in “substantially the same form” as the disapproved rule, unless it is 
specifically authorized by a subsequent law. Id. at 1. There has been very little case 
law interpreting the meaning of “substantially the same form” because the CRA also 
prohibits judicial review of any “determination, finding, action, or omission under” 
the CRA. Michael J. Cole, Interpreting the Congressional Review Act: Why the 
Courts Should Assert Judicial Review, Narrowly Construe “Substantially the Same,” 
and Decline to Defer to Agencies Under Chevron, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 53, 66 (2018). 
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the resolution into law.135  Pursuant to the CRA, this action prevented 
the rule from taking effect and prohibited OSHA from issuing a rule 
in “substantially the same form.”136  OSHA has not since attempted 
to issue an ergonomic rule, but it has developed industry-specific 
guidelines for minimizing ergonomic injuries, although such guidance 
is not legally binding.137  While OSHA can still cite employers for 
ergonomic hazards under the General Duty Clause,138 it rarely does 
so.139 
iii. OSHA’s Limited Capacity and Ineffectual Penalties 
A lack of regulatory tools is not the only impediment preventing 
OSHA from reducing warehouse worker injuries.  The agency has 
proven ineffective at enforcing its own standards, and such weak 
enforcement has been the norm for decades.140 
 
 135. See Finkel & Sullivan, supra note 128, at 122. 
 136. Id. at 101. 
 137. See id. at 122 (“OSHA has never since made any attempt to regulate in this 
area, although it has issued four sets of voluntary ergonomics guidelines — for 
nursing homes, retail grocery stores, poultry processing, and the shipbuilding 
industry.”); Ergonomics, Standards and Enforcement, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & 
HEALTH ADMIN. [hereinafter Ergonomics], https://www.osha.gov/ergonomics/faqs 
[https://perma.cc/N2PT-TCY8] (last visited June 12, 2021) (“OSHA has developed 
industry specific guidelines to provide specific and helpful guidance for abatement to 
assist employees and employers in minimizing injuries.”). 
 138. See id. 
 139. See Finkel & Sullivan, supra note 128, at 122. 
Even without a specific standard, OSHA could use its General Duty 
Authority to issue citations for ergonomic hazards that it can show are likely 
to cause serious physical harm, are recognized as such by a reasonable 
employer, and can be feasibly abated. However, in the more than ten years 
after the congressional veto of the ergonomics rule, OSHA issued fewer 
than one hundred such citations nationwide. For purposes of comparison, in 
an average year, federal and state OSHA plans collectively issue more than 
210,000 violations of all kinds nationwide. 
Id. One instance in which OSHA issued fines for ergonomic hazards under the 
General Duty clause occurred in 2015 and involved the supermarket chain, 
Hannaford Supermarkets. OSHA cited Hannaford for failing to keep two of its 
locations free from recognized hazards likely to cause MSDs. The company 
ultimately settled with the agency, agreeing to pay $9,750 in fines and make several 
changes to better protect employees. See Press Release, Occupational Safety & 
Health Admin., Hannaford Supermarkets Acts to Prevent Musculoskeletal Injuries 
for Warehouse Employees in Maine and New York (Aug. 19, 2015), 
https://www.osha.gov/news/newsreleases/region1/08192015 [https://perma.cc/J5L9-
D88E]. But as mentioned above, this case was the exception, not the rule. 
 140. See Press Release, Ctr. for Progressive Reform, New Report: COVID-19, 
OSHA’s Lackluster Enforcement History Highlight Need for Worker Empowerment 
(July 29, 2020), http://progressivereform.org/our-work/workers-rights/osha-50-nr-
072920/ [https://perma.cc/DKM2-4KYL] (“While the Trump administration’s ongoing 
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OSHA’s enforcement efforts were particularly weak under the 
Trump Administration compared to previous years.  According to 
OSHA’s own data, the agency conducted an average of 32,610 
worksite inspections per year during the first three years of the 
Trump Administration, which was down from an average of 38,092 
inspections per year under the Obama Administration.141  In addition, 
a 2020 report by the National Employment Law Project revealed that 
as of January 2020, OSHA had “the lowest number of on-board 
inspectors in the last 45 years.”142  “At this staffing level, it would take 
the agency a whopping 165 years to inspect each workplace under its 
jurisdiction just once.”143 
In addition to being understaffed, the financial penalties OSHA 
issues for violations tend to be very small, making enforcement both 
unlikely and inconsequential.144  The current maximum penalty for a 
serious OSHA violation is $13,653, while the maximum for a willful 
and repeat violation is $136,532.145  A violation is deemed “serious” 
when “it poses a substantial probability of death or serious physical 
harm to workers.”146  Even when OSHA does find a serious violation, 
it rarely imposes the maximum penalty.  In fiscal year 2019, the 
average penalty for a serious violation was only $3,717.147  According 
to a 2019 report authored by a coalition of non-profit and labor 
organizations, OSHA inspectors issued 67 citations at Amazon 
warehouses between 2015 and 2019, resulting in fines of $262,132, 
 
assault on our safeguards has worsened these problems and the shortcomings of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the agency’s lackluster 
enforcement efforts and failure to protect whistleblowers stretches back decades.”). 
 141. See DEBORAH BERKOWITZ, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, WORKER SAFETY IN 
CRISIS: THE COST OF A WEAKENED OSHA 4 (2020), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-
content/uploads/Worker-Safety-Crisis-Cost-Weakened-OSHA.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7TAU-BMH6]. 
 142. Id. at 2. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See AM. FED’N OF LAB. & CONG. OF INDUS. ORGS., DEATH ON THE JOB: THE 
TOLL OF NEGLECT 18 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 DEATH ON THE JOB], 
https://aflcio.org/sites/default/files/2020-10/DOTJ2020_Final_100620_nb.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E3QC-G9P9] (“A combination of too few OSHA inspectors and 
low penalties makes the threat of an OSHA inspection hollow for too many 
employers.”). 
 145. See OSHA Penalties (2021), OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., 
https://www.osha.gov/penalties [https://perma.cc/5WZA-TLBU]. This is up from a 
maximum penalty of $13,494 in 2020. See AM. FED’N OF LAB. & CONG. OF INDUS. 
ORGS., DEATH ON THE JOB: THE TOLL OF NEGLECT 19 (2020) [hereinafter 2020 
DEATH ON THE JOB]. 
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which represents roughly 0.0087% of Amazon’s profits in 2018 
alone.148  The infrequency of inspections and the low financial 
penalties for violations has made the threat of OSHA enforcement 
unable to deter many employers from wrongful behavior.149 
 Amazon has thus been able to sustain a work environment that 
puts its employees at risk of serious injury because of the limited 
regulation of employee surveillance, the lack of employment 
alternatives for warehouse workers, the ubiquity of at-will 
employment, and the limitations on OSHA’s enforcement 
capabilities. 
III. HOW TO STOP THE CLOCK: LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY 
EFFORTS TO REDUCE WAREHOUSE WORKER INJURIES 
A. Reform the OSH Act 
A straightforward way to reduce employee injury rates in 
warehouses would be for OSHA to set a standard aimed at restricting 
productivity quotas and protecting warehouse workers.  There is no 
indication that OSHA is considering such standards.150  In addition, 
given OSHA’s limited capacity, effective enforcement would be 
unlikely.151  To remedy this, Congress could enact specific reforms to 
strengthen the OSH Act and provide workers with greater 
protections. 
i. Private Right of Action 
Several scholars and practitioners have discussed the need for a 
private right of action under the OSH Act152 in order to enable 
 
 148. See ATHENA COAL., supra note 8, at 15. 
 149. See 2016 DEATH ON THE JOB, supra note 144, at 18. 
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https://cpr-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/OSHA-Private-Right-of-Action-
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/EN3X-WB5T]. See also NAT’L COUNCIL FOR 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, NATIONAL AGENDA FOR WORKER SAFETY AND 
HEALTH 4 (2021), https://nationalcosh.org/sites/default/files/2021-
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[https://perma.cc/M22W-VES8]. In this report, the National Council for Occupational 
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workers to file suit when an employer violates an OSHA standard 
and the agency decides not to inspect or issue a citation.153  At 
present, only OSHA has the right to pursue a claim under the OSH 
Act, rather than individuals.154  There are several statutes at the 
federal and state level that provide for private rights of action and 
could serve as models, such as the Clean Air Act155 and the Clean 
Water Act,156 as well as the California Private Attorney General’s 
Act.157  Typically, when a plaintiff is successful in a citizen suit, the 
remedy is either an injunction requiring the losing party to stop the 
violating action, or civil penalties obliging the violating party to pay a 
fine to the U.S. Treasury.158  A private right of action under the OSH 
Act would provide workers with recourse if OSHA decided not to 
respond to a violation and could have a deterrent effect on employers 
and motivate them to comply with OSHA standards.159 
In order for workers to take full advantage of a private right of 
action, they would need to retain attorneys, something that may be 
financially infeasible for many Amazon warehouse workers.160  In 
 
of the Protecting America’s Workers Act (PAWA) that would incorporate a private 
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 153. See CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, supra note 152, at 7. 
 154. See Malveaux & Cano, supra note 152. 
 155. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604. 
 156. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365. 
 157. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699 (Deering 2021); see also CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE 
REFORM, supra note 152, at 7. 
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[https://perma.cc/3J5R-FE92]). 
 160. See supra Section II.B. 
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addition, attorneys are unlikely to take a case if there is no guarantee 
of recovery of their costs, particularly in cases that require a 
significant time investment.161  For this reason, the Center for 
Progressive Reform has argued that a private right of action under 
the OSH Act should include a provision awarding reasonable 
attorney’s fees to individuals or organizations that initiate successful 
cases, including for those cases that settle.162  The Fair Labor 
Standards Act163 (FLSA) is a useful model for structuring an 
attorney’s fees provision under a private right of action.  Under the 
FLSA, a successful plaintiff recovers reasonable attorney’s fees from 
the defendant, calculated using the “Lodestar method,”164 in which 
fees are based on the number of hours reasonably spent by the 
attorney, multiplied by an hourly rate that is determined by the 
prevailing market rate for attorneys providing similar services in the 
jurisdiction.165  An attorney’s fees provision could make it more 
financially feasible for wronged employees to pursue a suit.166 
ii. Greater Whistleblower Protections 
The OSH Act prohibits employers from discharging or 
discriminating against an employee because he or she filed a 
complaint with OSHA.167  The Act also authorizes OSHA to 
investigate complaints and bring an action in federal court in the 
event that an employee is discriminated against for contacting 
OSHA.168  Despite these provisions, OSHA has a poor record of 
enforcing whistleblower claims, as shown by scholars such as David 
Kwok.169  Kwok noted that in fiscal year 2009, OSHA received 1,280 
 
 161. See CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, supra note 152, at 24. 
 162. See id. 
 163. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 
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retaliation complaints but OSHA investigators only recommended 
litigation in 15 cases.170  While it is difficult to determine whether the 
lack of enforcement was justified without a third-party analysis of the 
merits of the 1,280 cases, recommending 15 out of 1,280, a rate of just 
over 1%, suggests that OSHA does not prioritize the enforcement of 
whistleblower retaliation claims.171  More recently, the National 
Employment Law Project analyzed OSHA’s public data on employee 
retaliation complaints from the beginning of the COVID-19 
pandemic through August 9, 2020.172  Of the 1,744 complaints filed, 
only 348 complaints were docketed for investigation, and only 35 
were resolved during that period.173  Most of the complaints, 54%, 
were dismissed or closed without investigation.174 
Even if one assumes that the low rates of success are justified 
because most retaliation claims are meritless, such statistics could 
have the effect of discouraging individuals with valid claims from 
pursuing them.175  This is particularly concerning because many 
warehouse workers have limited employment alternatives,176 and 
therefore may already be hesitant to file an OSHA complaint for fear 
of losing their job.  This issue is further exacerbated if workers know 
that OSHA will not protect them from employer retaliation. 
The Center for Progressive Reform has highlighted specific 
shortcomings of the OSH Act’s whistleblower provision that could be 
reformed to make it easier for workers to file retaliation claims and 
provide them with more robust protection.  For example, one 
shortcoming is that employees only have 30 days to file a retaliation 
complaint with OSHA.177  A 30-day statute of limitations is an 
insufficient amount of time to determine that one’s employer acted 
 
 170. Id. at 1250. 
 171. Id. (“[T]he low litigation enforcement rate may suggest that OSHA is not 
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 176. See supra Section II.B. 
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174 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIX 
unlawfully, consult with an attorney or representative, decide whether 
to file, and file a complaint.178  Subsequently, even when filed, OSHA 
frequently takes longer than the 90-day statutory deadline to 
investigate complaints, which can “contribut[e] to the erosion of 
evidence, signal[] to other workers that they should not speak up, and 
leav[e] the worker who was retaliated against in the lurch for months 
or years.”179  Finally, if OSHA does find that an employer unlawfully 
retaliated against an employee, there is no fine for breaking the 
law.180  Instead, the employer is only responsible for the amount the 
employee would have earned, minus any amount the employee 
received from another employment source while the case was 
pending.181 
There are several other whistleblower statutes that offer greater 
worker protections than the OSH Act and provide examples for 
reform.  For example, the Surface Transportation Assistance Act and 
the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act provide workers with 
180 days to file a complaint, rather than 30 days.182  Also, many 
modern whistleblower statutes require the enforcing agency to 
investigate a retaliation complaint within 30 or 60 days.183  Finally, 
some whistleblower statutes allow for larger recoveries.  The 
Taxpayer First Act of 2019, which prohibits employers from 
retaliating against employees who provide information in an 
investigation regarding underpayment of taxes, states that awards for 
successful plaintiffs include “the sum of 200 percent of the amount of 
back pay and 100 percent of all lost benefits, with interest.”184  
Bringing the OSH Act in line with these provisions could reduce the 
considerable barriers that workers face when pursuing a claim, and 
help create a meaningful deterrent for employers. 
OSHA reforms are critical to ensuring that all employees under 
OSHA’s jurisdiction are equipped with the tools to file complaints 
and seek justice when employer violations do occur.  At the time of 
writing this Note, Congress is not considering a reform to create a 
private right of action under the OSH Act or a reform to the Act’s 
 
 178. See id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. See id. at 27. 
 181. See id. 
 182. See id.; see also Surface Transportation Assistance Act, 49 U.S.C. 
§31105(b)(1); Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
314, 122 Stat. 3016. 
 183. See CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, supra note 152, at 27. 
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whistleblower provision.  Thus, advocates should continue to call 
upon legislators to prioritize strengthening the OSH Act, as well as 
OSHA’s enforcement efforts.  In the meantime, it is useful to 
examine other avenues for legal reform that might provide 
protections to warehouse workers at risk of injury, in the absence of 
congressional action. 
B. Restricting the Quota Directly: California’s                           
State Assembly Bills 
In February 2020, California State Assemblywoman Lorena 
Gonzalez introduced Assembly Bill 3065 in the state legislature, 
which would have prohibited California employers from counting a 
“reasonable amount[] of time” that an employee spends in the 
restroom or accessing hydration as “toward the time required for 
completing the quota, or results in the employee having less time to 
complete the quota.”185 
The bill attempted to limit the common occurrence in warehouses 
where workers do not have time to use the restroom because of the 
quota.  The text of the bill acknowledged that “[w]arehouse and 
distribution center employees who work under such quotas frequently 
skip restroom breaks in order to keep up with their quota.”186  
Restricted access to restrooms and water breaks can lead to medical 
issues such as urinary tract infections187 or dehydration,188 as well as 
the spread of illnesses such as COVID-19 when workers do not have 
adequate time to wash their hands.189  Although Amazon has claimed 
 
 185. Assemb. B. 3065, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020). 
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that the company changed its policy in the spring of 2020 to ensure 
that time spent washing hands did not count against an employee’s 
quota, several employees reported that they were never informed of 
this policy change, and therefore continued to skip bathroom breaks 
or hand washing to make rate.190 
While the California bill passed in the State Assembly by a margin 
of 52 to 20,191 it failed in the State Senate.192  Critics of the bill 
expressed concern that the bill’s text did not define or otherwise 
provide guidance on what constituted a “reasonable” amount of time 
in the restroom or on a hydration break, and this lack of clarity could 
make it difficult for employers to comply.193 
In February 2021, Assemblywoman Gonzalez introduced another 
bill, Assembly Bill 701, targeting warehouse productivity quotas.194  
The bill acknowledges the relationship between productivity quotas 
and high risks of injury or illness, and states that “[t]he workforce in 
warehouse and logistics is largely comprised of people of color who 
depend upon these jobs to provide for their families and often see no 
alternative but to prioritize quota compliance over their own 
safety.”195  The bill seeks to increase transparency about the use of 
warehouse productivity quotas and place restrictions on what 
behavior can be considered time off task. 
Assembly Bill 701 would require employers to provide employees, 
upon hire, with written descriptions of quotas to which they are 
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subject, and include in those descriptions any adverse employment 
action that might result from an employee’s failure to meet the 
quota.196  The bill would also prohibit employers from taking adverse 
employment action against employees “for failure to meet a quota 
that does not allow a worker to comply with meal and rest periods, or 
occupational health and safety laws.”197  The bill further specifies that 
“[a]ny actions taken by an employee to comply with occupational 
health and safety laws in the Labor Code or division standards shall 
be considered time on task and productive time for purposes of any 
quota or monitoring system.”198  Under the bill, an employee could 
bring a suit for injunctive relief to obtain compliance with the above 
provisions, and if successful, would recover costs and reasonable 
attorney’s fees.199 
Assembly Bill 701 also includes a mandate requiring Cal/OSHA to 
propose standards by 2023 to “minimize[] the risk of musculoskeletal 
injuries and disorders among employees working in warehouse 
distribution centers.”200  The mandate stipulates that the standards 
shall address, among other considerations, “the relationship between 
quotas and risk factors for musculoskeletal injuries and disorders in 
warehouse distribution centers that employ production quotas.”201  
Under the bill, Cal/OSHA would have the power to subpoena and 
inspect records of productivity quotas at warehouses in connection 
with the development of standards.202  This mandate to create 
standards would allow Cal/OSHA to more closely regulate 
warehouses across the state, and fill gaps in federal OSHA 
regulations.203  The standards could include targeted restrictions on 
productivity quotas, such as a firm limit on how many boxes workers 
are required to fill per hour, or more general safety protocols, like a 
requirement that workers be allowed a five-minute stretch and water 
break every hour. 
 
 196. See id. § 2101. 
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On May 28, 2021, Assembly Bill 701 passed the State Assembly by 
a margin of 52 to 19 votes.204  While in the State Senate, senators 
amended the bill and removed the mandate requiring Cal/OSHA to 
propose standards to reduce ergonomic injuries in warehouses.205  
With this amendment, the bill passed in the State Senate on 
September 8, 2021, and was signed by the Governor two weeks 
later.206 
C. Restricting Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace:    
Massachusetts and Illinois Bills 
i. The Massachusetts Approach 
In February 2021, State Senator Cynthia Stone Creem introduced a 
bill in the Massachusetts State Senate called the Massachusetts 
Information Privacy Act.207  Among other things, the bill would place 
several restrictions on employers when using electronic monitoring.  
The bill defines electronic monitoring as “the collection of 
information concerning employee activities, communications, actions, 
biometrics, or behaviors by electronic means.”208  This would likely 
include employee productivity data gathered through Amazon’s 
electronic system.  The bill states that an employer shall not 
electronically monitor its employees unless the only purpose of the 
monitoring is to, “i. enable tasks that are necessary to accomplish 
essential job functions; ii. monitor production processes or quality; iii. 
comply with employment, labor, or other relevant laws; iv. protect the 
safety and security of employees,” or another purpose deemed 
acceptable by the Massachusetts Department of Labor Standards.209  
The proposed legislation further stipulates that any electronic 
monitoring must be necessary to accomplish the allowable purpose, 
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be limited to the smallest number of employees, and collect the least 
amount of information necessary to accomplish the purpose.210 
While the bill attempts to limit the use of electronic surveillance by 
employers, its language is likely broad enough to permit Amazon’s 
employee surveillance.  Amazon could justify its electronic 
monitoring of employees by saying such monitoring “enables[s] tasks 
that are necessary to accomplish essential job functions.”211  The 
company could argue that while employees use scanners that 
electronically monitor their productivity, the scanners instruct 
workers which items to pick and where to place them, which is 
essential to the job.  Even if monitoring productivity did not fit into 
the first allowable purpose, it would fit into the second allowable 
purpose, which is “monitor[ing] production processes.”212 
The Massachusetts bill also states that when relying on information 
gathered from electronic monitoring to make employment-related 
decisions, including discipline and termination, employers cannot 
make such decisions solely based on data from electronic 
monitoring.213  In other words, if an employer intends to terminate an 
employee based on data gathered from electronic monitoring, such as 
productivity data, the employer must also base the termination on 
other information as well, such as a supervisor’s assessment or 
complaints of co-workers.  While this provision may afford some 
protection to workers, it would not be onerous for Amazon to find an 
additional reason to justify the termination, such as an instance of 
lateness.  It is possible that identifying a reason for termination that is 
not based on electronic monitoring would cause Amazon 
inconvenience, particularly if the company felt the need to hire more 
supervisors to facilitate human-based surveillance.  But the 
Massachusetts bill does not change the at-will employment 
framework, which allows employers to terminate employees for any 
reason provided the reason is not illegal.214  Thus, while Amazon 
would have to find a second reason to justify terminating an 
employee, it would not need to be a good reason. 
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ii. The Illinois Approach 
In February 2021, the Illinois Employee Security Act was 
introduced in the state’s General Assembly.215  If passed, this bill 
would prohibit employers from discharging, disciplining, or 
promoting an employee based on data gathered through “electronic 
monitoring,” which is defined as “the collection of information 
concerning worker activities, communications, actions, biometrics, or 
behaviors by electronic means including, but not limited to, video or 
audio surveillance, electronic work pace tracking, and other 
means.”216  The bill further stipulates that employment decisions, such 
as termination or disciplinary action, must be based on “human-based 
information sources such as supervisors’ assessments and 
documentation or consulting co-workers.”217 
The Illinois bill also includes a provision that would prohibit 
employers from discharging employees without just cause.218  There 
are three types of reasons for discharge that comprise “just case.”219  
The first reason provided by the bill, namely an employee’s failure to 
satisfactorily perform job duties, is the most relevant to terminating 
an employee for not meeting a productivity quota.220  The bill 
instructs factfinders to consider the following factors in determining 
whether an employee has been discharged for just cause for failure to 
satisfactorily perform job duties: the employee knew or should have 
known of the employer policy, the employer provided adequate 
training to the employee, the employer’s policy was reasonable and 
applied consistently, and the employer undertook a thorough and fair 
investigation.221  The employer bears the burden of proving just 
cause.222 
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The bill provides that aggrieved employees or their representatives 
can file a complaint with the Illinois Department of Labor.223  Upon 
receiving a complaint, or of its own volition, the Department would 
investigate the alleged violations, determine whether any violations 
occurred, and take appropriate action to enforce the rules laid out in 
the bill.224  If an unlawful discharge is found, perhaps because the 
employer relied on electronic monitoring in making the decision or 
because the employer’s policy was unreasonable, the bill provides for 
“actual and liquidated damages payable to each aggrieved worker 
equal to the greater of $10,000 or 3 times the actual damages 
including, but not limited to, unpaid wages, benefits, and other 
remuneration from the date of discharge.”225  The bill further 
specifies that in the case of an unlawful discharge where severance 
pay was not provided, the Department shall order “severance pay 
together with an additional 2 times that amount as liquidated 
damages, and such other remedies as may be appropriate including 
punitive damages.”226  In addition, the bill states that any individual 
claiming to be aggrieved by an employer’s violation of the Act has a 
cause of action in any court.227 
A law like the Illinois Employee Security Act would prohibit 
employers from using employee productivity data acquired through 
electronic monitoring systems to fire or discipline employees.  
Theoretically, if Amazon wanted to fire or discipline an employee for 
not making rate, the company would need to rely on a supervisor’s 
assessment of the employees’ productivity, which would make it more 
difficult for Amazon to enforce its quotas.  While using supervisors to 
monitor employee productivity might seem like a simple policy 
change, a typical Amazon warehouse employs hundreds, sometimes 
several thousand, workers.228  A law that restricted Amazon to only 
rely on human evaluation for disciplinary purposes, rather than its 
current electronic system, would be disruptive to the company’s 
warehouse model.  Tasking individuals with employee monitoring, 
rather than an electronic system, requires hiring more employees and 
would be less efficient than tracking productivity through electronic 
monitoring.  Also, even if supervisors were able to identify which 
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employees failed to meet their quotas without an electronic system, 
the proposed law would provide an opportunity for a factfinder to 
evaluate Amazon’s quota policy for reasonableness when deciding 
whether the employee was terminated for just cause.229 
It is worth noting that the Illinois bill does not prohibit electronic 
monitoring itself, as employers are still permitted to gather the data.  
The bill simply places restrictions on how the data can be used.  Also, 
the bill allows employers to use data gathered through electronic 
monitoring in select circumstances, namely for non-employment-
related purposes, for firing or disciplining workers in cases of 
egregious misconduct, or where there is a threat to the health and 
safety of others, or where required by state or federal law.230  
Prohibiting the collection of any data through electronic monitoring 
could be an extreme restriction because, as the text of the Illinois bill 
suggests, there may be purposes for such data gathering other than 
surveilling employee productivity.  For example, if an employee is 
accused of assaulting a fellow employee during work hours, the 
Illinois bill would likely allow the employer to rely on electronic video 
footage documenting the assault to be the basis of the termination. 
The Illinois bill also contains a provision about the posting of 
rights, which states that the Illinois Department of Labor will publish 
notices informing employees of their rights under the Act, and 
employers will be required to post such notices in a conspicuous place 
in the workplace, and give the notice to each employee at the time of 
hiring and on an annual basis.231  This provision would help ensure 
that workers know that they cannot be terminated based on data 
gathered through electronic monitoring and that they can only be 
fired for just cause. 
IV. A WAY FORWARD VIA THE ILLINOIS APPROACH AND                         
THE CALIFORNIA MANDATE 
States that wish to protect warehouse workers from undue 
workplace injuries should follow the Illinois approach, which restricts 
how employers can use electronic monitoring and installs a just cause 
mechanism in the state’s employment law structure.232  This model 
would be the most effective state legislative approach at preventing 
Amazon from terminating workers for failing to meet productivity 
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quotas and would provide workers with recourse if such termination 
does occur.  The Illinois approach combats several of the factors that 
have enabled Amazon to push its workers to the point of serious 
injury without repercussion, including unrestricted employee 
surveillance and at-will employment.  When employees know that 
they can only be terminated for just cause and that employment 
decisions cannot be based on data gathered through electronic 
monitoring, they are less likely to work at dangerous speeds for fear 
of being fired.  In addition, the provision of the bill providing a 
comprehensive financial award to workers who file successful 
complaints would lessen the financial risk associated with reporting a 
violation. 
This Note also recommends an element of the original California 
bill, namely, the mandate for Cal/OSHA to propose and adopt 
standards aimed at limiting worker injuries in warehouses that use 
productivity quotas.233  If other states with their own OSHA plans 
adopt similar provisions, such standards could provide greater 
protections to warehouse workers and fill gaps in federal OSHA 
regulations.234 
A. Electronic Monitoring and Just Cause 
States with Amazon warehouses should use the Illinois bill as a 
model.  The Illinois approach would prohibit employers from using 
data gathered through electronic monitoring to make employment 
decisions.235  A company like Amazon would be prohibited from 
disciplining or firing an employee based on electronic data about the 
employee’s productivity rate.236  Instead, an employment decision 
would need to rely on human-based information.237  The Illinois 
approach is more stringent than the Massachusetts bill, which would 
prohibit employers from making an employment decision solely 
based on information gathered through electronic monitoring.238  
Under the Massachusetts bill, Amazon could skirt enforcement by 
pointing to another reason for the termination, such as an instance of 
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lateness or a request for a shift change, and claim that it also 
contributed to the decision.  In addition, since the Massachusetts bill 
does not include a just cause mechanism, the reasons for the 
termination would not need to be reasonable.  By contrast, the Illinois 
approach completely removes data from electronic monitoring as a 
possible justification for employment decisions.239 
One might argue that even under the Illinois approach, an 
employer’s justification for discharging an employee could be 
pretextual.  That is, Amazon could rely on electronic monitoring to 
terminate an employee but simply claim that the decision was based 
on a supervisor’s assessment.  While such a scenario is possible, the 
Illinois bill provides a second line of defense for workers by including 
the just cause requirement.  As mentioned above, almost every state 
in the country currently has an employment-at-will framework, 
meaning that employers can fire workers for any reason, as long as 
the reason is not unlawful.240  The just cause requirement in the 
Illinois approach would fundamentally change the framework by 
affirmatively requiring employers to have a good reason for 
termination.241  Thus, even if an employer’s reasons for a worker’s 
discharge were pretextual, and were based on productivity data 
gathered through electronic monitoring, the just cause framework 
requires an employer to prove it had just cause for the firing, and a 
fact finder would have the opportunity to interrogate the employer’s 
justifications and assess the employer policy for reasonableness. 
A just cause requirement would also provide protection to workers 
if Amazon found a way to discern which employees were not making 
rate without using electronic monitoring.  For example, if Amazon 
terminated an employee based on a supervisor’s assessment that the 
employee was working too slowly, Amazon would have to prove just 
cause and that its policy of requiring employees to work at such 
speeds was reasonable.  Thus, even if Amazon can measure a 
worker’s productivity without the use of electronic monitoring, 
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workers will have greater protections under the Illinois bill than they 
currently have. 
The Illinois approach would also protect workers from being 
terminated for taking bathroom breaks or washing their hands — the 
situation that the California bill is trying to prevent.  Under the 
Illinois approach, employers could not justify a termination based on 
data from electronic monitoring that showed an employee missed her 
productivity goal as a result of using the restroom.  If an employer 
instead attempted to fire a worker based on a supervisor’s assessment 
stating that the worker missed her productivity goal due to time spent 
in the restroom, factfinders would be able to evaluate the 
reasonableness of the productivity policy. 
In addition, the Illinois approach would provide compensation to 
employees who were wrongfully discharged, namely, three times 
actual damages, as well as severance pay, combined with two times 
that amount as liquidated damages.242  Providing such a 
comprehensive award to workers who have been wrongfully 
terminated is likely to make filing a complaint a more feasible course 
of action for employees and may also deter employers from firing 
workers without just cause. 
The Illinois bill contains a provision that would require employers 
to post notices in a central location in the workplace informing 
employees of their rights under the Act.243  This provision is crucial to 
include in the legislation because merely changing the law does not 
guarantee that employees will be aware of their rights and 
protections. 
B. Critiques of a Just Cause Approach 
As mentioned in Section II.C, defenders of at-will employment 
argue that it benefits both employers and employees, and that 
limitations on at-will, such as a just cause requirement, would 
interfere with freedom of contract.244  But the enormous power 
imbalance between Amazon and its warehouse workers, who often do 
not have better job alternatives,245 means that workers cannot bargain 
for safer working conditions.  By requiring employers to terminate 
workers for a good reason, rather than for failure to meet dangerous 
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productivity standards, just cause protections can help ensure that 
employees can work at a safe pace. 
There will likely be business critics of an Illinois-type approach, 
including Amazon itself.  Such critics might argue that just cause 
protections force employers to retain unproductive workers or 
workers who violate rules.246  However, the just cause protections 
embedded in the Illinois approach do not prohibit firings but instead 
simply require that the employer policy that led to the termination 
was reasonable.247  For example, firing an employee who consistently 
arrived late to work would not violate the just cause requirement, 
provided the policy was applied consistently, and the employee knew 
of the lateness policy and received a warning that frequent tardiness 
could lead to termination. 
Some might criticize the Illinois approach as too extreme because 
the just cause requirement would apply to all employers rather than 
just warehouse employers.  It is possible that a provision with such a 
wide application would be met with greater opposition in state 
legislatures.  However, states seeking to follow the Illinois approach 
that are worried about a blanket just cause requirement could tailor 
their legislation so that the just cause provision only applies to 
warehouse employers.  Given the high rates of injury among 
warehouse workers,248 the essential nature of their work,249 and 
OSHA’s failed attempts to reduce warehouse employee injuries,250 
including a just cause requirement that applies to warehouse 
employers is critical. 
It is also worth highlighting that support for just cause policy is 
growing.  In 2019, the Philadelphia City Council adopted a just cause 
law for parking lot workers, and in 2020, New York City approved 
just cause protections for fast-food employees.251  A February 2021 
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poll revealed that 71% of voters in battleground congressional 
districts expressed support for the adoption of just cause laws.252  
Likely voters in contested congressional districts were asked: “In 
most jobs in the United States, a worker can be fired without any 
warning or explanation.  Do you favor or oppose ‘just cause’ laws, 
which require that workers must receive advance notice and a good 
reason before they can be fired?”253  This survey was consistent with 
previous polls, such as a 2020 Data for Progress survey, which found 
that just cause was supported by 67% of likely voters.254  Thus, while 
just cause requirements may be unpopular among employers, there is 
increasing support for such protections among employees and city 
governments. 
C. Mandate to State OSHA to Promulgate Standards 
The 22 States with their own OSHA plans that cover private 
employers255 should follow the example of the mandate originally 
included in California’s State Assembly bill 701256 and pass legislation 
requiring their state OSHA agencies to promulgate standards aimed 
at reducing employee injuries in warehouses.  Such a mandate could 
lead state OSHA agencies to adopt standards that more directly 
regulate the use of productivity quotas, such as a strict limit on how 
many boxes a worker can be expected to fill per hour or a 
requirement that warehouses meet certain ergonomic guidelines.  
Given the gaps in federal OSHA regulations,257 state OSHA agencies 
should step in to protect warehouse workers from frequent and 
serious injury. 
To promulgate health and safety standards for warehouses, state 
OSHA agencies will need access to information about the use of 
productivity quotas in warehouses statewide.  Such data will enable 
state OSHA agencies to understand how productivity quotas are 
being used and what kind of intervention is required to reduce worker 
injuries.  Thus, legislation modeled after the California mandate 
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should include provisions requiring employers to disclose to the state 
OSHA agency productivity quotas or goals used in the warehouse, 
including an explanation of any adverse employment action that an 
employee might face for failure to meet the quota. 
CONCLUSION 
Although warehouse workers perform essential work,258 their 
health and safety have been neglected.259  Amazon has sustained a 
workplace that drives workers to their physical limits, leading to 
employee injury rates far above the industry average.260  The 
company has maintained such unsafe working conditions because of 
the limited regulation of employee surveillance, the lack of job 
alternatives for warehouse workers, the ubiquity of at-will 
employment, and the limitations on federal OSHA’s regulatory and 
enforcement capabilities.261 
States should take inspiration from the Illinois approach and enact 
legislation that both restricts how electronic monitoring data can be 
used and creates a just cause requirement for warehouse employers.  
Such legislation would make it more difficult for companies like 
Amazon to fire employees based on electronic monitoring and place 
an affirmative obligation on warehouse employers to have a good 
reason for terminating workers.  Workers would not need to work at 
dangerous speeds for fear that failing to meet an unreasonable quota 
would get them fired.  They would not need to avoid using the 
restroom or taking water breaks. 
States with their own OSHA plans that cover private employers 
should pass legislation requiring their state OSHA agencies to adopt 
standards to reduce employee injury rates at warehouses.  Such 
standards could more specifically target warehouse worker safety and 
fill in gaps in federal OSHA regulation. 
Employees should not be forced to work at speeds that sacrifice 
their well-being.  Enacting legislation similar to the Illinois approach 
and the California mandate is a crucial first step to creating safe work 
environments for warehouse employees. 
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